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The processing of messages in the political world is often a function of the frames in 
which the information is embedded (e.g. Druckman 2001; 2007; Gamson 1989; Iyengar 
1991; Jacoby 2001; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997).  These frames have the ability to 
alter preferences based on how people process information.  Research on frames has 
neglected how an individual‟s personality creates the ability to resist or accept the various 
frames found in political communications.  The question at hand is whether framing 
effects vary based on personality traits and typologies, or if people universally succumb 
to them when controlling for factors such as knowledge and core value dispositions (see 
Zaller 1992; Chong and Druckman 2007).  The study uses the Big Five Inventory and 
Prospect Theory from the Minnesota Twin Study in the attempt to understand how 
personality affects preference change based on framing.  Findings show agreeableness to 
be the only factor to affect preference changes between prospect theory‟s loss and gain 
frames.  In addition, personality traits are not found to affect the choice of a risky or sure 
option in gain and loss frames.  However, conclusions indicate the possibility of 
personality causing variation in preference changes due to framing effects once political 
rhetoric is entered into the equation. 
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The processing of messages in the political world is often a function of the frames 
in which the information is embedded (e.g. Druckman 2001; 2007; Gamson 1989; 
Iyengar 1991; Jacoby 2001; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997).  These frames have the 
ability to alter preferences based on how people process information.  Research on frames 
has neglected how an individual‟s personality creates the ability to resist or accept the 
various frames found in political communication. 
Framing effects have drawn relevancy from prospect theory proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1989), the psychological model proposes the occurrence of a 
preference change stemming from the content being framed as a gain or a loss.  However 
the inability to come to harmonious understanding of framing effects has plagued social 
science research, including political psychology and political communication (see, 
Druckman 2007a).  People such as Zaller (1992) and Bartels (2003) argue that framing 
effects are not as consequential as others believe them to be because people do not 
actually hold consistent preferences.  Druckman (2001c; 2004) questions some of the 
findings based on equivalency frames arguing that the context of the political arena is so 
rich with content differences.  The methods employing these, such as prospect theory, 
have less significant results than studies utilizing emphasis or issue frames.  Others have 
attempted to look at mediating and moderating effects that would help to explain 
inconsistencies in findings (e.g. Slothuus 2008).  One area not explored in the framing 
literature involves the differences within the individual: his/her personality.   Recently 
political science researchers are bringing up the importance of the five factor model of 
personality and its potential direct and indirect effects on political attitudes and behavior 
(e.g. Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Mondak 
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forthcoming).  The question at hand is whether framing effects vary based on personality 
traits and typologies, or if people universally succumb to them when controlling for 
factors such as knowledge and core value dispositions (see Zaller 1992; Chong and 
Druckman 2007).   
 The following thesis looks into whether personality affects people‟s resistance to 
frames, or the ability of a person to maintain the same preference regardless of how a 
situation is worded.  The study uses the Big Five Inventory and Prospect Theory from the 
Minnesota Twin Study in an attempt to understand how individual differences result in 
framing effects.  Prior to the findings, current research on frames is reviewed and the 
argument of why certain personality factors, specifically the five factor model and 
personality typology, may result in a person succumbing to or resisting frames is 
developed.  Finally, conclusions are discussed and implications for further research are 
explored. 
Frames 
Framing research in political science has many roots in prospect theory.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; 1986) offer prospect theory 
as an answer to the critique of utility theory and rationality, stating when faced with a 
decision dealing with risk, people are not rational actors.  People given two equivalent 
problems with a different frame will alter their preference because “changes of 
perspective often reverse the relative apparent size of objects and the relative desirability 
of options” (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 453).  Most often, these frames are 
characterized as placing the problem in a positive/gain context or a negative/loss context 
framework. 
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 Prospect theory works on the principle that people evaluate the information they 
are given from a neutral baseline with the value of the decision being either as positive or 
negative (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).  The S-shaped value function proposed by the 
work of Tversky and Kahneman depicts the relative increase in gains from the neutral 
point is more gradual than the losses.  Figure 1 depicts Prospect Theory‟s S-curve.  
Therefore, problems framed as negative or in terms of losses have more of a negative 
impact on the outcome value than the same problem in a positive or gain frame.  For 
instance, a problem that says you may lose $10 dollars has more of a detrimental effect to 
the person‟s decision outcome than a problem that says you may gain $10.  In addition, 
the nature of the S-shaped curve means that as the values get farther away from neutral, 
their relative impact is less.  For instance, a problem that changes the value from $5 to 
$10 has more of an impact on someone‟s final decision than moving from $100 to $105 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; 1986). 
Outcome 
Value 
Losses 
Gains 
Figure 1. S-Curve of Prospect Theory 
Adapted from Tversky and Kahnamen (1981, 454). 
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Based on the value curve, people are more likely to choose a risk aversion choice 
under a gain frame and make a risky choice under the loss frame and people put more 
weight on low probabilities and less weight on those probabilities that are moderate or 
high (Tversky and Kahneman 1981).  One of the more broadly used problems of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1981) involves participants making a decision between two programs to 
combat a disease.  Half of the participants were given the following options and asked 
which program they would prefer: 
Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 
people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people 
will be saved. 
 
Out of the people that receive this set of programs, 72 percent chose Program A and 28 
percent chose Program B.  The difference between the two conditions in which the 
programs are laid out is whether the solutions are equated with positive or negative 
results.  The above program options are discussed in terms of how many people‟s lives 
would be saved.  The other half of the sample was given the same program options, but 
the frame is in terms of how many people are going to die.  The second group was asked 
to make a preference based on the following two programs. 
 
Program C is adopted 400 people will die. 
Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 
nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will 
die. 
 
For this second condition, 22 percent chose Program C and 78 percent chose Program D.  
Although Program A and C are equivalent and B and D are the same, the majority chose 
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program A in the gain frame and D in the loss frame.  Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
argue that this change in policy preference, going from risk aversion in the gain frame to 
risk seeking in the loss frame is due to the S-shaped value curve discussed above. 
 The risky choice frame from prospect theory has been used to depict the 
equivalency frame in research where separate conditions have as little content differences 
as possible (Druckman 2001c; Druckman and McDermott 2008).  In addition, prospect 
theory‟s argument that people are not rational and wording effects alter preferences in an 
irrational way has been demonstrated in framing research (e.g. Druckman2004; Iyengar 
1991; Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997).  Although prospect theory lacks the contextual 
factors often regarded as necessary when studying framing (Druckman 2001c), it allows 
us to strictly look at how wording induces people to change their preferences in a way 
that is not questioned by compounding factors, such as previous beliefs that are inevitable 
when studying politics.  By taking away all contextual factors and looking at how simply 
redefining a problem through a different set of words, it makes it possible to look at the 
raw effects and whether or not individuals differ or if framing effects are more universal.  
Framing in political science takes the notion from prospect theory that words alter a 
person‟s perspective changes, and ultimately changing their preferences. 
 A frame connects, by constructing perceptions of reality, the individual and the 
social world (Gamson 1989; Edelman 1993; Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997).  In an 
attempt to bring definitions from research on framing to a cumulative understanding, 
Entman (1993, 52) argues that the composition of a frame defines problems, diagnoses 
causes, makes moral judgments, and suggests remedies.  Edelman‟s (1993, 232) 
characterization of the social world being a “kaleidoscope of potential realities,” 
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emphasizes how the composition of a frame creates an interaction between a message and 
perception.  Preferences are based on how one views the world.  Therefore, each time the 
message alters the perception of the political world a different preference is potentially 
constructed from the context portrayed in the frame.  Large effects of opinion change 
have been found as a result of exposure to frames (e.g. Iyengar 1991; Nelson, Clawson 
and Oxley 1997). 
 Although others have identified frames in a different light (Iyengar 1991; Levin, 
Johnson, and Gaeth 1998), two types of frames are generally discussed in the social 
science literature.  These two types include “emphasis” framing where there is significant 
differences in what is in a frame (see Druckman 2001b) and “equivalency” frames where 
there are minimal differences between frames (see Druckman 2001a).    Prospect theory 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1981; 1987; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 1986; Quattrone 
and Tversky 1988) is often included in the equivalency frame category given that the 
choices are offered as logically equivalent (Druckman 2004).  Emphasis framing, on the 
other hand, uses two arguments that highlight a different constructs to induce a 
preference change.  The classic example of emphasis framing comes from the experiment 
by Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson (1997) where people were more likely to approve of a 
Ku Klux Klan rally when it was framed as a first amendment right and less likely to 
support the rally if they were exposed to the issue within a social order frame.   
 Several models emphasize the structure of how people‟s preferences are 
organized into cognitive connections between different concepts (e.g. Kellstedt 2005).  
The initial preference is referenced by the expectancy value model where the attitude is 
the summation of each attribute.  These individual attributes hold either a positive or 
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negative connotation and has a specific level of importance that corresponds with the 
salient issue (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997).  
Therefore, where a person stands on an issue is dependent on both what attributes are 
connected to the issue and how much emphasis is placed on each.  These preexisting 
cognitive structures create the baseline in which people then assess the options they have.  
It is important not to forget that Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 453) state that the 
decision is “controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, 
habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker.”  Understanding how these 
aspects of a person, held within his/her personality shape how one interacts with frames.  
Personality traits may induce someone to be more inclined to accept what one hears while 
others might make them more critical. 
How that cognitive structure is reorganized by way of information is the framing 
effect.  Zaller (1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992) argues that frames increase accessibility 
of an issue dimension.  The frame merely highlights one cognitive path that had 
previously been in the dark based on the political context at the time.  Others argue that 
the effect is due to a change in the rank order of the values associated with the preference 
(Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997; Druckman, forthcoming; Chong and Druckman 2007) 
through the interaction with the substantial content found within the message (Jacoby 
2000).  These two models differ in the extent of change in the structure of the preference.  
Zaller (1992) believes a frame only calls up information while Nelson and colleagues 
offer an explanation that calls for an actual change in opinion by way of the information 
given.   In either case, the way a person has organized the cognitive pathways is 
dependent on how he/she sees the world which is dependent on his/her personality. 
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Frames must have a communicator and a receiver.  Research has demonstrated the 
effectiveness of frames arising from elites and politicians (Jacoby 2000; Nelson, Oxley, 
and Clawson 1997; Druckman, forthcoming; Wagner 2010), interest groups (Gerrity 
2010; Terkildsen, Schnell, and Ling 1998), the media (Iyengar 1991; Kellstedt 2005), and 
the public (Entman 2003; Druckman and Nelson 2003).  However, there is a lot of 
differences in what aspects of the receiver result in framing effects.  Research has shown 
that high political knowledge does not mediate the framing effect (e.g. Druckman 2004), 
while others argue that sophistication does mediate the influential power of frames (Cobb 
and Kuklinski 1997).  Iyengar (1991) and Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) find partisans are 
able to resist the effects of frames in some circumstances but not in others.  In addition, 
people with prior attitudes toward the issue are influenced by frames (Erison, Lodge and 
Tabor 2007), while Slothuus (2008) and Tabor, Cann and Kucsova (2009) find a framing 
effect for only those with weak values associated with the issue prior to exposure to the 
frame.   
 In an attempt to find why at times, exposure leads to the framing effect, 
researchers look at frames in two ways: what leads people to change their preference 
based on a frame and what other consequences beyond a strict change of attitude frames 
have on a person.  Druckman (2001b) uses the research of Lupia and McCubbins (1998) 
to investigate how credibility matters.  In addition, other research has examined what 
occurs when competing frames are used in an experiment (Chong and Druckman 2007; 
Sniderman and Theriault 1999) and how deliberation with other people affects the 
likelihood of a framing effect (Druckman 2004).  Much research has gone into how 
emotional states (Druckman and McDermott 2008) and emotional traits affect framing 
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(Mayer and Tormala 2010) and the effects of emotions brought up in the frame itself 
(DeSteno, et al. 2004).  Research looking at different outcomes of frames include how 
emotions are molded differently depending on the frame (Gross and Brewer 2009; Gross 
and D‟Ambrosio 2004) and how competing frames allow for clear distinction between 
the parties (Wagner 2007).  As with any research endeavor, more findings lead to more 
questions.  This continues to be the case with framing. 
 Using the assumptions of the previous models, people differ in whether or not 
anything in their cognitive structure changes, as evidenced in the mixed results of the 
receivers and the change (or lack of change) for each mediating factor researched.  The 
problem may be that these psychological models do not take into account that people are 
different and how they approach political information and use it is different as well.  
Differences offer potential explanation to the long-standing quandary as to why cognitive 
structure change occurs for some but others are able to resist change and maintain their 
previous convictions.  
Personality and Politics 
 Arguments of personality causing variance in political behavior can be found 
leading back to Adorno, et al. (1950) with the examination of the authoritarian 
personality and in the research of the personality of political leaders (Barber 1992; 
Winter 2003) and Lasswell‟s famous policy scientist of democracy (1951).  However, 
these studies are limited in how much they look at a broad notion of personality.  This 
criticism harped by Mondak (forthcoming; Mondak and Halperin 2008), was initially 
brought to the forefront by Sniderman (1975).  Mondak argues that the problem continues 
today with people only looking at what personality factors suit their current research 
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rather than taking a holistic approach to how personality creates variance in political 
behavior and attitudes. 
 Recent work has devoted much of what is known about psychology to 
understanding ideology, including Jost et al.‟s (2003) meta-analysis of the psychological 
variables that predict conservatism.  In addition, ideology differs based on personal 
values between conservatives and liberals (Caprara et al. 2006), use of personal morality 
organization based on moral foundations theory (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009).  Jost 
(2003) offers examples from numerous studies that outline differences between 
conservatives and liberals from his and colleagues work, ranging from cleanliness to 
depression.  Block and Block (2006) have found that these personality differences related 
to ideology do not emerge in adulthood, but far before one ever identifies as conservative 
/liberal, but while in preschool.  Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) take the concept 
farther stating that ideology goes back to genetics.  Mondak (forthcoming) argues for the 
relationship between this genetic finding by Alford and colleagues to be one connected 
by personality.    
The Trait Approach and the Five Factor Model in Politics 
 As outlined by Sniderman (1975; Mondak and Halperin 2008), the field of 
political psychology is not at total fault in its inability to have a coherent approach to 
psychological traits.  However, this has been able to change based on the field of 
psychology and its ability to agree (at least to a large degree) on the presence of five 
factors that are able to describe a broad range of  personality in individuals that lead to 
observable behavior that is stable over time (McCrae and Costa 1990) and between 
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cultures (De Raad et al. 1988).  A continued presence of searching for an understanding 
behind ideology has been prominent in the research concerning the Big Five in politics. 
 Results concerning the connection between personality and ideology in the mass 
public have been unable to apply each personality factor to a specific ideological or 
partisan category (Alford and Hibbing 2007; Mehabrian 1996; Mondak and Halperin 
2008) with better findings found for an Italian sample population by Caprara et al. 
(2006).  In addition variance between the same personality traits held by blacks and white 
reflects differences in ideology (Gerber et al. 2010).   
 Moving beyond the connection of ideology and personality, Mondak and Halperin 
(2008) examine the relationship between the Big Five and numerous items concerning 
political participation, attitudes and predispositions, and information and opinionation.  
The findings from this study indicate that the main predictors in political engagement are 
extroversion and agreeableness.  Attitudes and predispositions are highly connected to the 
person‟s level of conscientiousness and openness to new experiences.  Last, information 
and opinionation is connected to openness the most, with extroversion and 
conscientiousness also exerting influence.  Looking specifically at the amount of opinions 
held on political topics, extroversion increases the number of opinions with openness 
increasing them the most and neuroticism decreasing the number of opinions.   
However, there is not always a direct relationship between personality and 
political behavior.  Although it is quite probable that there is a different “political 
temperament” not explained by personality (Alford and Hibbing 2007), perhaps the 
answer is that there are other factors that connect with personality that end in the 
behavior outcome studied.  Increasing the nuance and understanding how personality 
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works with civic engagement by looking at the antecedents to behavior (Mondak et al. 
2010) and component attitudes (Gerber et al. 2010) allow for more understanding of how 
personality is connected to behavior.  The findings by Mondak et al. (2010) indicates that 
extroversion increases engagement only for those activities that are social.  When 
somebody is low on the agreeableness scale but has a larger network size, they are more 
prone to discuss politics with people of different viewpoints than those found to be high 
in agreeableness.  In addition, only when the importance of a campaign activity is seen as 
important, does conscientiousness increase the level of participation.  In addition, when 
political attitudes are broken down into economic and social elements, Gerber et al. 
(2010) finds stronger results linking personality and ideological preferences – to the point 
that the Big Five is just as significant an indicator of ideology as education and or 
income.  Lastly, Mondak (forthcoming) provides a reason for the findings by Hibbing, 
Theiss-Morse and Whitaker (2009) as to why a portion of the population would prefer 
quick action to deliberation by Congress by interacting personality with demographic 
variables of age and sex.  These findings indicate the complexity of the interaction 
between the person and the environment rather than a simple relationship that is easy to 
understand. 
 The model proposed by Mondak et al. (2010) emphasizes relationships involving 
biological forces that are involved with personality, environment and other factors 
leading to the political behavior.  Also, as previously reported, Tversky and Kahnemnan 
(1981) accept individual differences lead to the different decisions.  The connection 
between the environment, in this case the frame, and the person‟ s movement from the 
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baseline, or their personality and biology is the piece of the puzzle not quite understood at 
this point.   
The Big Five 
  So what specifically constitutes the Big Five and where did it come from?  The 
beginning of looking at traits with the use of everyday language was initiated with 
Allport and Odbert (1936) in order to create a taxonomy in which to categorize people.  
Using the dictionary as a source of terms used to describe individuals, Allport and Odbert 
(1936) organized words that could be used to describe people into four categories: traits, 
states, evaluations of behavior, and physical abilities and likenesses.  The lexical 
approach began under these two researchers with their emphasis on the notion that 
descriptions and adjectives of people found in the natural language are the best way in 
which to understand differences in people.  Research developed from there into what is 
known as the lexical approach to personality traits. 
 Early work on personality includes Cattell‟s (1945; Cattell, Eber, and Tatsuoka 
1970) use of clusters and the reduced number of terms used to describe personality led to 
the creation of an index consisting of sixteen personality factors.  Using the work of 
Cattell and colleagues as well as Fiske‟s (1949) factoring of Cattell‟s work, Tupes and 
Christal (1961) were able to verify the validity of five factors through the analysis of 
various sample populations within the air force.  These five factors were given their 
original, standard names by Norman (1963).  Extroversion or surgency, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability versus neuroticism, and culture were coined as the 
Big Five by Goldberg (1981) with his explanation of the broadness of these five factors.  
Work continued categorization of terms by Norman (1967) and constructions by 
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Goldberg (1990) allowed for the replication of the Big Five over various methods, 
including self and peer ratings.  
 Although Goldberg (1992) emphasized the lexical approach in his inventories, 
using single adjectives in his Trait Descriptive Adjectives (TDA), McCrae and Costa 
emphasize the questionnaire method in their five factor theory.  Research by McCrae and 
Costa (1976) began with looking at neuroticism, extroversion and openness based on the 
work of Cattell et al. (1970) and eventually included items for agreeableness and 
conscientiousness in their final NEO Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R) (Costa 
and McCrae 1992).   Mondak (forthcoming; also, McCrae and John 1992; John, Nauman, 
and Soto 2008) emphasizes that the differences behind Goldberg‟s lexical approach and 
McCrae and Costa‟s five factor theory is the extent to which the researchers‟ believe the 
taxonomy takes the field of personality.  Where Goldberg (1993) believes strictly in 
terms of the Big Five as a taxonomical tool for personality psychologists, McCrae and 
Costa (2008) argue that the five factor model has the potential to becoming a full theory 
with more research based on the findings of stability across life and circumstance and the 
biological basis that seems to help mold a person‟s personality.    
 A third approach to measuring personality traits is the Big Five Inventory created 
by John and colleagues.  John (1990) utilized categorization by different judges of 300 
terms from the Adjective Check List, resulting in 112 terms that could be considered the 
“core” components of the five factors (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008).  In comparisons 
of the three main measurement strategies, John, Naumann, and Soto (2008) find that 
similar results among the five factors present themselves when the three are compared.  
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The largest difference comes with openness, which is the most contested factor in 
general. 
 Each factor of the Big Five is discussed below.  Each one has been used to 
explain a variety of behaviors in and out of the political world.  Most of the work has 
been applied to job performance (e.g. Barrick and Mount 1991; Laursen, Paulkkinen, and 
Adams 2002; Huang, Chi and Laler 2005), social networks (e.g. Berkman et al. 2003; 
Robins et al. 2002), and risky behaviors (e.g. Malouff, Thorsteinsson and Schutte 2006; 
Laursen, Pulkkinen and Adams 2002; Bogg and Roberts 1991).  Each description consists 
of adjectives and elements from several different conceptualizations of the five factor 
model.  As discussed earlier, there are differences between individual researchers in 
regard to what the exact computation of each factor is, but there is also considerable 
agreement.  The following focuses on the agreement between the numerous researchers 
on what each factor consists and the expected effect each will have on altering a person‟s 
preference based on exposure to a frame. 
Extroversion 
 Extroversion usually involves adjectives including talkativeness, energy level and 
assertiveness (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008) and includes the facets of warmth, 
excitement seeking, and positive emotionality (Costa and McCrae 1995) with inventories 
using items such as assertiveness, excitement seeking, and activity (McCrae and John 
1992).  Extroversion has been found to increase civic participation and political 
involvement (Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008).   
Literature on extroversion finds that the trait is connected to participation in 
politics, but there is no literature that would direct whether it is associated with a 
16 
preference change based on framing effects.  Levin et al. (2002) finds that extroversion 
does not explain variance in the framing effect they investigate.  Heinström (2003) finds 
a lower level of confirmation bias in information search tasks for those high in 
extroversion.  Therefore, extroversion may lead to higher amounts of exposure to new 
frames.  In addition, Mondak and Halperin (2008) find when people score higher on 
extroversion, they also have more opinions on things.  Exposure to many new frames 
may create the heightened number of opinions.  However, Mondak and Halperin (2008) 
do not study the stability of these opinions or where they come from.  Therefore, 
although high extroverts may have many opinions on political issues, whether they are 
more likely to be influenced by the many frames they are exposed is unclear.  Therefore, 
there is no direction for extroversion hypothesized in this thesis. 
Agreeableness 
The historical disagreement on what constitutes agreeableness is outlined in 
Digman (1990) and has much to do with how narrow/broad other dimensions are defined 
(McCrae and John (1992).  For example, if warmth is considered a part of extroversion, it 
is not also a component of agreeableness but if warmth is absent in a researcher‟s 
conceptualization of extroversion, warmth becomes a characteristic of agreeableness.  
Facets of agreeableness outlined by Costa and McCrae (1995) include trust, altruism, 
compliance, modesty, tendermindedness, and straightforwardness.  John and Strivastava 
(1999) conceptually define agreeableness as one with high scores having a prosocial 
disposition and having a common good approach to their behavior.  Other research has 
used terms including generosity and empathy (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008).  As 
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described by Mondak (forthcoming), the literature on agreeableness emphasizes the 
interpersonal relationship context of the trait. 
Recent work on information and personality traits has found a connection 
between higher levels of agreeableness and lower levels of opinion, attention and 
discussion of politics (Mondak and Halperin 2008).  Additionally, individuals who have 
high levels of agreeableness tend to be less likely to read novels and foreign literature or 
watch cultural programs (Kraaykamp and Eijck 2005).  In addition, Heinström (2003) 
found that people with low levels of agreeableness engaged in more critical thinking and 
Levin et al. (2002) find that agreeableness leads to preference shifts in prospect theory.  
However, these same agreeable individuals also found it difficult to determine the 
relevancy of information.  The trusting nature of individuals with high scores of 
agreeableness induces them to be likely to accept what they see/hear as valid.  This point 
is also emphasized in the inability of agreeable individuals to distinguish valuable 
information from the invaluable.  Therefore, agreeableness allows for people to believe 
information that may not be credible and not know how to distinguish context that is not 
credible from what is.  These aspects of agreeableness will result in a preference change 
between the conditions. 
Conscientiousness 
 Tension between researchers on conscientiousness rivals that of agreeableness, 
with some arguing the two should be collapsed and other arguments concerning the 
amount of ambiguity associated with the trait (Digman 1990) and the close connection to 
each other (McCrae and John 1992).  John and Srivastava (1999) conceptualize 
conscientiousness as an impulse control of behavior that makes a person goal and task 
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oriented.  Facets of the NEO-PI-R for conscientiousness include deliberation, self-
discipline, order, dutifulness, competence, and achievement striving (Costa and McCrae 
1995).  Those high in conscientiousness are thought to be the good in contrast to the evil 
(McCrae and John 1992). 
 In terms of information, conscientiousness has been found to lead to changing 
preferences in accordance with prospect theory.  In addition, Mondak and Halperin 
(2008) find that reported levels of news viewing discussion of politics, and number of 
opinions increase for those that are high in conscientiousness, but the interviewers rated 
the same people as lower in knowledge, interest and information on politics.  Kraaykamp 
and Eijck (2005) find conscientious people choose romance books over literature and 
Heinström (2003) finds that they choose information with a high confirmation bias while 
those low on the trait have a hard time distinguishing between information that is relevant 
and not.  The findings and the psychological conceptualizations on conscientiousness 
support the notion that their order and deliberation and self control leads to the resistance 
of a framing effect. 
Neuroticism 
 The literature is more coherent in what researchers describe to be neuroticism or 
emotional stability, its opposite (McCrae and John 1992).  Costa and McCrae (1995) use 
the facets of anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and 
vulnerability.  These fit well into John and Srivastava‟s (1999) definition as negative 
emotionality, nervousness, and high levels of tension.  Opposing these concepts are 
feelings of calm and relaxation.  Based on the above research, those found to be higher on 
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the neurotic scale are less able to keep tabs on negative feelings and thoughts of 
questioning themselves intruding on their thought process. 
 Levin et al. (2002) found preference change for those scoring high in neuroticism.  
In addition, Mondak and Halperin (2008) find emotional stable individuals to have less 
opinions, knowledge, and to be involved in political discussions.  Neurotic individuals 
are also less likely to know what information is relevant for the task at hand (Heinström 
2003) and more likely to read romance novels rather than foreign or literary novels and 
erotic shows rather than cultural or informative programs (Kraaykamp and Eijck 2005).  
The self conscious factor of neurotics possibly leads them to accept what they are told 
rather than what they think by not fully believing in one‟s own attitudes.  In addition, the 
potential anxiety that is created by not agreeing with what information they come into 
contact most likely lead to a those high on the neuroticism scale to have a preference 
change between framing conditions.  
Openness to Experience 
 The fifth factor was originally labeled culture in the studies of Norman (1963) and 
Tupes and Cristal (1961).  Others have used the category intellect also to describe the 
trait (e.g. Digman and Takemoto-Chock 1981).  Factor V has since been labeled openness 
with the notion that it is broader than just culture and intellect (e.g. McCrae 1996).  
Therefore, there is still a debate as to what the last factor entails.  John, Naumann, and 
Soto (2008, 120) define openness as “the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of 
an individual‟s mental and experiential life.”  John and Srivastava (1999) contend that the 
range of the fifth factor is pure intellect to rebelliousness once personality inventories are 
taken to other cultures.  McCrae and John (1992, 197-8) emphasize the point, although 
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the trait has been labeled by many researchers as intellect, it involves such things as 
unconventional values, an appreciation of the arts, the need for varying experiences from 
values to ideas to fantasies.  Therefore, it should be understood that IQ does not correlate 
with the fifth factor and it is not a measure of actual intelligence. 
 The facets for openness, used by the NEO-PI-R, are fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, 
actions, ideas, and values (Cost and McCrae 1995).  In addition, adjectives associated 
with the factor are curious, wide interests, insightful, introspective, and imaginative 
(McCrae and John, 1992) and openness holds the verbal labels of originality and open-
mindedness (John, Naumann, and Soto 2008).  In their research on personality types and 
media consumption, Kraaykamp and Eijck (2005) find that people with higher scores on 
openness are more likely to read intellectually stimulating books and it is less probable 
that they read romantic novels.  In addition, the study finds that openness isassociated 
with watching cultural and informative television and is negatively associated with 
watching soap operas.  Information search research by Heinström (2003) finds those 
scoring higher in openness are less likely to have confirmation biases define their search, 
be more critical of information, and be more likely to try and gain new information from 
their information search.   
 Using openness as an independent variable on information and number of 
opinions on political issues, Mondak and Halperin (2008) find openness to be a very 
significant predictor of the level of knowledge, interest, and discussion as well as the 
number of opinions held by people.  In addition, openness was found to account for 
preference changes within the prospect theory frame by Levin et al. (2002).  Openness 
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appears to be the most significant variable in information based findings using the trait 
approach (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Kraaykamp and Eijck 2005).   
Based on the findings by Heinstöm (2003), I take a split with Levin et al (2002) 
with the hypothesis that people high in openness will be less likely to follow the framing 
effect.  Although openness predicts a willingness to look for different information and 
enjoy new experiences, they also seem to be critical of what information they are exposed 
and enjoy intellectually stimulating material, most likely because they enjoy being 
challenged.  Those that are more likely to succumb to a framing effect are not critically 
looking at the information or using communications as an intellectually stimulating and 
challenging experience.  Therefore, those high in openness will be more likely to not 
have a preference change between framing conditions.   
Personality as a Typology 
 A less researched perspective on personality is the typology where the emphasis 
lies on the person as a combination of traits rather than individual trait variables (Robins 
et al. 1998).  The typological method was first utilized in the work of Block (1971) where 
five categories were found for males and seven for females.  The three typologies that 
have been replicated from Block‟s original study (some with different category titles) are 
resilient, undercontrolling, and overcontrolling (e.g. Robins et al. 1996; Robins et al. 
1998; Asendorpf, et al. 2001; Raamstedt et al. 2004; York and John 1996).  Cluster 
analysis or inverse factor analysis is typically used in these studies to determine the 
similarities in people to create groups that differ between each other. 
Based on the work of Block (1971), resilients can be described as insightful, 
socially perceptive, and internally consistent (143-4).  Overcontrollers tend to be self-
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defensive, distrustful, uncomfortable with uncertainty, brittle, fearful, and submissive 
(162).  Last, undercontrollers are characterized as being moody, changeable, irritable, and 
“skilled in techniques of imaginative play” (181).  These categories have been found to 
correlate with five factor models of personality (e.g. Robins et al. 1996; York and John 
1996; Robins et al. 1996; Asendorpf et al. 2001).  Figure 2 demonstrates how the five 
traits fit into the different typologies. 
Personality Trait Resilients Overcontrolled Undercontrolled 
Extroversion High Low Medium 
Agreeableness High High Low 
Conscientiousness High Medium Low 
Neuroticism Low High High 
Openness High Medium Low 
Figure 2. Trait Levels for 3 Typologies 
Source. Robins, et al. (1998, 198) 
 
Little research has used the personality typologies to understand specific 
behavior.  Robins et al. (1996) do find that typologies are associated with intelligence and 
school performance conduct, as well as psychopathologies.  A majority of the research 
concerns with validating samples across different dimensions, such as across time (Caspi 
and Silva 1995), race (Robins et al. 1996), and gender (York and John 1996; Pulkinnen 
1996).   
People consist of different levels of each trait, not dominated by one.  By looking 
at typologies, the research can determine if sets of traits can overcome the effects of one.  
For instance, if neuroticism is associated with changing preferences and 
conscientiousness with resisting framing effects, as hypothesized, what happens when the 
two are intermingled in one person?  Looking at typologies allows research to understand 
how framing effects work in a person by looking at common patterns and understanding 
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how each trait affects another.  Individual trait research on the other hand only looks at 
the effects of each trait – we might find that neuroticism increases the likelihood of a 
preference change and conscientiousness reduces it.  However, people might have high 
levels of both.  Typologies allow research to determine which trait wins out the framing 
war.  
Based on the dearth of literature, hypotheses on typologies and framing effects are 
not based on the strength of research seen in the above analysis of individual traits.  
However, based on how Block (1971) and current research describing the categories, one 
would expect resilients to be less likely to change their preference due to the framing 
effect, undercontrollers to be most likely to change and overcontollers to be in the 
middle, on the side of less likely to succumb to a frame. 
Data and Summary of Hypotheses 
 The analysis is derived from data coming from a detailed survey, taking 
approximately 30 to 40 minutes, answered by U.S. adult twins enrolled in the Minnesota 
Twin Family Registry.  The survey asked a wide variety of questions concerning social 
and political issues, values, and behaviors.  There are approximately 8,000 twin pairs 
born from 1936 to 1955 in Minnesota that were recruited from birth records.  Lykken, et 
al. (1990) has detailed analysis on the registry following the majority of the recruitment, 
from 1983 to 1990 and Krueger and Johnson (2002) discuss the registry and current 
research findings using it.  Although this is a twin study that normally is used for 
heritability studies, it will be used here for an individual analysis because it both 
measures traits with the Big Five Inventory and includes a framing experiment based on 
the work of Kahneman and Tversky. 
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 After initial responding, 1,202 individuals complete the survey in 2008.  An 
additional 200 participants were recruited in 2009 in an attempt to increase the numbers 
of dizygotic twin males.  All participants were either monozygotic twins or dyzogotic 
twins of the same gender.  The final number of cases within the data set is 1,349.  
Roughly one-third of the participants identify themselves as liberal, one-third moderates, 
and one-third as conservative.  The vast majority of the participants are white, 98.6 
percent.  The sample population is relatively well educated with just under a quarter of 
the participants having graduated college and another quarter having some college or an 
Associated Degree.  In addition, the mean income is between $60,000 and $80,000.  Last, 
66 percent of the respondents are female. 
 Collection of the data was overseen by John Hibbing and Kevin Smith of the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln and implemented by the University of Minnesota.  The 
survey was completed for most of the participants (93 of the original 1,202 completed a 
paper version due to limited internet activity).  Each registered twin was sent an 
invitation by mail.  All respondents were offered $35 for participating.  The cooperation 
rate was 61 percent. 
 The hypotheses developed from the above literature are tested through two 
models utilizing the Minnesota Twin Study data.  The first set of hypotheses involves 
looking at data from the traditional five factor model with a variable perspective.  The 
second model comes from the perspective of the person as a whole, trait typology.  By 
using the odds ratios coming from the logistic regression models, the study is able to 
understand the likelihood the personality trait will affect a preference change between the 
gain and loss frame conditions.  The models will allow us to understand how a person 
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with a high level of each trait will act against how one low in each specific trait will act.  
Additional logistic models are included to determine if personality traits and typologies 
affect whether someone is more likely to choose the risky option in the initial gain or loss 
option set he/she received. 
Higher scores on agreeableness and neuroticism are expected to lead to a 
preference change between opting for the sure and risky option between the conditions.  
Conscientiousness and openness to experiences are expected to lead to a person being 
less likely to have a preference change.  Finally extroversion, although associated with 
exposure to information is not expected to explain variance in preference change in this 
study.    
Rather than looking at traits individually and comparing them in standard x 
changes y means, the typology approach produces groups of people which must be 
compared to each other.  The second set of hypotheses deals with the groups created by 
the three typologies based on the work of Block (1971) and the application of those 
typologies to the five factor models (e.g. Robins et al. 1998; Asendorpf et al. 2001).  
Both, the descriptions of the groups and the trait make-up based on the hypotheses above 
are used to determine the hypotheses.  The typology characterized as resilients should 
display a strong unlikelihood to change preference compared to the other two typologies 
based on the descriptions of them being internally consistent (Block 1971) and the high 
levels of conscientiousness and openness and low levels of neuroticism that is associated 
with the group (Robins et al. 1998).  Overcontrollers are also expected to not indicate a 
preference change compared to undercontrollers based on the depictions of them as being 
fearful and distrustful (Block 1971) and their high levels of agreeableness and 
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neuroticism moderated by the mid levels of conscientiousness and openness.  Last, 
undercontrollers should be more likely than both of the other typologies to change their 
preference based on the characterization by Block (1971) as being changeable and their 
high level of neuroticism and low levels of conscientiousness and openness (Robins et al. 
1998).   
 The dependent variable, based on two prospect theory questions within the 
survey, is a dichotomous variable labeled „preference change,‟ coded as 1 if there was not 
a change between option sets and “0” if someone went from choosing the sure option on 
one problem to the risky option on the next or vice versa.  Each participant was given 2 
separate option sets with two choices and were instructed to indicate his/her preference 
on each set individually.  One condition held two options, where both choices were 
framed as gains.  These options were: 
Option 1. 80 percent chance of gaining $4,000. 
Option 2. 100 percent chance of gaining $3,000. 
The second condition the participants were exposed to presented the two options in a loss 
frame and were instructed to make a preference between the following two options.   
Option 1. 80 percent chance of losing $4,000. 
Option 2. 100 percent chance of losing $3,000. 
At the beginning of the survey each participant was randomly assigned to get the gain 
condition first or the loss options first.  When randomly assigned to the gain condition 
first they viewed the first set of options shown above immediately followed by the second 
set given above.  If the participant was assigned to receive the loss condition first, they 
27 
made the preference for the second set of options and then were instructed to make a 
choice for the second set immediately afterwards. 
  For each model, preference change is the dependent variable used indicating 
whether the person alternated from the risky option to the sure option and vice versa in 
the above two problems.  Frequency data shows that 27.8 percent of the participants did 
not change their preference between the two items and 72.2 percent did change their 
preference. 
 The independent variables are individual personality traits taken from the Big 
Five Inventory (BFI) (e.g. John and Srivastava 1999).  The BFI consists of 44 likert-
scaled items asking participants if a short phrase consisting of some context with the 
target adjective is descriptive of themself.  Participants indicate whether they 
agree/disagree on a five-point scale based on the question, “I see Myself as someone 
who…”  The scales for the five traits consist of eight to ten items.  See Appendix A for 
the full inventory.   
 Controls added to the model with the personality include gender, income, 
education, and whether the person received the loss frame first.  Race is not used as a 
control due to the essential lack of variance in the sample.  Income is used based on the 
notion that the two prospect theory items involve getting and losing money.  Therefore a 
person at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale may see the value of the money more 
important than one that has a higher income.  Education is used with the notion that more 
schooling is theoretically supposed to instill more analytic thinking within a person.  In 
addition, gender is controlled for because females are thought to be more risk averse than 
men.  Last, a dummy variable indicating which frame the participant received first is 
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included to ensure that any explained variance is not due to a question ordering 
phenomena.  Information on how each control variable is measured and coded is found in 
Appendix B. 
Method 
 The main component of the analysis is binary logistic regression analysis with the 
use of two separate models.  Prior to running regressions, the data was cleaned and 
scaled.  The first model utilizes scales made from the respondents‟ logged BFI item 
scores.  The second model uses the raw score scales to look at personality typologies.  
Below describes first how the scales were created and how the scales were clustered into 
three typologies prior to moving to the models. 
 In order to lower the level of skewedness occurring from social desirability 
factors, the scales are constructed from both raw and logged items as described by 
Mondak et al. (2010).  Appendix C illustrates the correlations between each trait on the 
raw scale and logged scale scores.  The correlations indicate that the logged scores have 
properly identified the original scores with correlations all above .97.  To create the 
logged score scales the items were all recoded so that 1 indicates the highest value for the 
trait and 5 the lowest.  Second, the natural log of each item was taken and the items were 
re-coded to be between 0 and 1 with 1 being the highest value for the trait and 0 being the 
lowest.  The scales were then constructed by averaging the logged items for each, 
corresponding trait.  Properties of the scale in Table 1 and Table 2 show correlations 
between the scales indicating that the two are measuring different concepts and the 
Cronbach‟s alpha scores.  The Cronbach scores are well within the range found 
commonly in the U.S. and Canada, between .75 and .90 (John and Srivastava 1999).    
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Extroversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Neuroticism Openness
Extroversion 1
Agreeableness 0.233 1
Conscientiousness 0.269 0.399 1
Neuroticism -0.284 -0.316 -0.273 1
Openness 0.367 0.135 0.153 -0.146 1
Table 1. Five Factor Scale Correlations
All coefficients statistically significantp< .001.  
 
 In addition, factor analysis was performed on the 44 logged items to determine if 
each item loaded on the factors found by previous research on the BFI (e.g. John, 
Naumann, and Soto 2008).  The factor analysis resulted in 8, rather than 5 factors, 
indicating that all items for extroversion, neuroticism, and agreeableness factor as 
previously reported.  However, the analysis indicates that three of the openness items 
load on a 6
th
 factor and one on an 8
th
 factor and 2 of the conscientiousness items load 
onto a 7
th
 factor.  The separate loading of the openness is not terribly surprising based on 
the research suggesting somewhat of a disagreement on the fifth factor.  Appendix D 
contains the factor analysis loadings.  Because of these, analysis was run on both the 
original logged item scales and with scales missing these six variables in hopes to 
increase the power of the models. 
Trait Factor
Scale mean 
(s.d.)
Cronbach's 
alpha
Number of       
Cases
Extroversion
8.394   
(2.897)
0.866 1349
Agreeableness
4.243   
(2.545)
0.779 1349
Conscientiousness
4.093   
(2.600)
0.796 1349
Neuroticism
9.115   
(2.272)
0.828 1349
Openness
8.289        
(2.989)
0.838 1349
Table 2. Scale Reliability Statistics
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 In order to examine whether it is a specific combination of personality traits held 
by a person, or his/her trait typology, that determines whether a preference change occurs 
as a result of framing, cluster analysis was performed on the raw scores.  Clusters were 
derived from the procedure set out in the personality typology studies (e.g. Robins et al. 
1996; Asendorpf 2001).  First, the Ward, hierarchical clustering was applied to the entire 
data set using the raw trait scales.  The analysis initially places every case into its own 
category.  With each iteration, the two clusters with the closest squared Euclidean 
distance are combined.   The three cluster category based on findings by research on 
typology is used for the second classification.  Second, a K-sort, non-hierarchical cluster 
method was used to classify the cases based on the proximity of Euclidean centers.   
Using K-sort allows for the more optimal once the Ward‟s procedure is used (Asendorpf 
et al. 2001).  Linear discriminate function was used to understand what the personality 
typologies looked like (and described below) and to validate the original clusters.   
 The last set of models are based on the clusters formed in the procedure iterated 
above.  Two dummy variables are created as independent variables so that the 
coefficients represent the comparison of one group to another.  One dummy variable is 
coded so that 1 is the first cluster and represents the difference between groups one and 3 
on preference change.  The other dummy variable created is coded that a 1 represents 
group 2.  Therefore, the coefficient explains the difference between group 2 and 3 in 
terms of preference change.   
Results 
 Initial correlations do not show any significance for preference change except 
openness to experience does come close for a one-tailed test at .132.  Table 3 shows the 
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correlations for preference reversal and the five personality traits.  Although the 
correlations do not show significance, binary regression was computed to determine if 
there was something to be learned. 
 
 Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, binary logistic 
regression was used resulting in logged odds for each personality trait and the controls.  
These logged odds were transformed into odds ratios by subtracting one from the logged 
odds.  By doing so, one is able to understand the substantive likelihood high versus low 
levels of a personality trait affects whether a person will change his/her preference 
between gain and loss conditions.   
 Table 4 presents the results of two logistic regression analyses.  The first model 
uses all 44 logged items in the creation the Big Five variable scales; the second model 
takes out the six variables that did not load on the traditional five factors.  Both models 
include the constant variables.  As expected from the correlation results, personality is 
not shown to explain preference change between the two conditions.  Both models 
indicate agreeableness as being the only independent variable significant at the .10 level.  
In addition, the dummy variable for sequence of frames (where 1 indicates the loss frame 
was given first), is significant at .000.  The sequence variable indicates that people 
Preference 
Reversal
Extroversion 0.002
Agreeableness 0.048
Conscientiousness 0.002
Neuroticism -0.026
Openness 0.041
Table 3. Correlations*
*None of the correlations reach 
significance at the .1 level.
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receiving the loss frame first are 54% less likely to have a preference change than those 
who did not receive the loss frame first.  Also, the presence of high levels of 
agreeableness increases the likelihood of making a preference change over those that do 
not score high on agreeableness.   
When it comes to preference change, receiving the loss frame first followed by 
the gain frame, there is less of a preference change compared to those who did not 
receive the gain frame first.  In each condition, the person makes a preference and keeps 
with it, signifying the impression that being exposed to a loss frame has on a person.  
Viewing the loss frame first induces people to not completely adhere to prospect theory 
expectations and act in more rational ways.  Those high on agreeableness are more likely 
to go from the gain to loss frame and experiencing a change in options from the sure to 
risky or vice versa.  This is an indication that those high on agreeableness are following 
what is expected from prospect theory by changing preferences and acting in an irrational 
way. 
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The second way in which one may look at personality is by person as a mixture of 
personality traits rather than by a trait alone.  The clusters are first compared to the 
previous research in personality typology and five factor models (e.g.Robins et al. 1998; 
Asendorpf 2001).  Based on these two functions, cluster one consists of people which are 
extrememely low on conscientiousness and agreeableness and somewhat high on 
extroversion and somewhat low on neuroticism.  Cluster 2 consists of individuals holding 
lower values for neuroticism and somewhat higher levels of extroversion and hovers 
slightly higher than the midline for conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness, 
which is similar to the Resilient category.  The traits correlate in same direction as 
previous research but not the same intensity.  However, the lower values seen here were 
found in one of the child studies of Asendorpf (2001).  The last cluster consists of those 
low in extroversion and high in neuroticism with somewhat higher levels than the middle 
Exp β Odds Exp β Odds
Extroversion 0.863 -13.7% 0.925 -7.5%
Agreeableness 2.162* 116.0% 2.158* 115.8%
Conscientiousness 0.603 -39.0% 1.379 37.9%
Neuroticism 1.092 9.2% 1.073 7.3%
Openness 1.311 31.1% 0.972 -2.8%
Gender 1.09 9.0% 1.09 9.0%
Education 1.018 1.8% 1.024 2.4%
Income 1.049 4.9% 1.049 4.9%
Sequence Dummy 0.451** -54.9% 0.451** -54.9%
Constant 2.408* 1.579
Nagelkerke R2
N
Table 4. Logistic Regression Results for Preference Change and BFI 
Scales
Full Item Scales
Scales Based on 
Factor Loadings
DV: Preference Change=1
0.052 0.052
Notes: *p<.10; **p<.001
1013 1013
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for conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness.  This is very similar to the previous 
research findings for the overcontrolled personality type which is associated with low 
extroversion, neuroticism, and agreeableness scores as well as middle levels of 
conscientiousness and openness scores.   
 The second model consists of a logistic regression model with the dichotomous 
preference change variable as the dependent variable.  However, the independent 
variables are the three clusters in order to determine if the variance in the framing effect 
can be explained by a pattern of personality traits that are visible in the sample 
population.  The results in Table 5 demonstrate that none of the personality typologies are 
significant in understanding preference change due to personality type.  The only 
significant variable is the sequence dummy indicating that those receiving the loss frame 
first are 54% less likely than those who do not get this condition first to have a preference 
change between the two sets.  The typology model demonstrates the similarity in both 
models as having the same control variable dominating the framing scene.  It also leads to 
the questioning of agreeableness being a dominant factor in preference change due to 
framing.  Where it is significant when looking at traits one-on-one, it loses its power 
when looked at in a combination of traits. 
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 With the pronounced effect of the Sequence Dummy variable, the next step is to 
understand what the effect is.  Does the pronounced effect make people more risky in 
gain or loss framed problem options?  Also, does the effect operate in the same direction 
as what prospect theory informs us?  Under prospect theory, people are more likely to 
choose the sure option when the options are presented as gains and more likely to opt for 
the risky choice under the loss frame.  In order to answer these questions, there are four 
additional logistic regression models provided below.  The first two models in Tables 6 
and 7 use the same Big Five Personality trait scales as Table 4 and the last two models 
use the personality typologies from Table 5 in Tables 8 and 9.  In each of these models, 
the dependent variable has changed and now is the respondent‟s choice in the first set of 
options they encountered in the survey, the sure option (coded as 0 in the models) or the 
risky option (coded as 1 here) for all four models.   
Each survey participant was randomly assigned to receive the options within a 
gain frame first or the options with the loss frame first.  The previous models have 
combined these two conditions into one variable.  However these last four models break 
Exp β Odds
Cluster 1 0.891 -10.90%
Cluster 2 1.073 7.30%
Gender 1.114 11.40%
Education 1.026 2.60%
Income 1.034 3.40%
Sequence Dummy 0.452** -54.80%
Constant 2.981
Nagelkerke R2
N
Table 5. Logistic Regression Results for 
Preference Change and Personality 
.047**
Notes:  **p<.001
DV: Preference Change=1
1013
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them back down to two separate conditions.  Tables 6 and 8 consist of those participants 
receiving the loss frame first with the independent variables being the Big Five Scales 
and personality typology variables, respectively.  Tables 7 and 9 consist of the 
participants who received the gain frame first with the independent variables being the 
Big Five Scales and personality typology scores, respectively. 
 
Table 7. Logistic Regression Results for Risk Preferences and 
Receiving the Gain Frame First using the BFI Scale 
DV: Risky OptionChosen=1    
 Full Item Scales 
Scales Based on Factor 
Loadings 
 Exp β Odds Exp β Odds 
Extroversion 0.614 -48.6% 0.587 -41.3% 
Agreeableness 1.119 11.9% 1.047 4.7% 
Conscientiousness 0.308 -69.2% 1.919 91.9% 
Neuroticism 2.258 125.8% 2.229 122.9% 
Openness 1.071 7.1% 0.997 -0.3% 
Gender 1.052 5.2% 1.047 4.7% 
Education 1.182 18.2% 1.188 18.8% 
Income 1.342** 34.2% 1.337* 33.7% 
Exp β Odds Exp β Odds
Extroversion 1.035 3.5% 1.117 11.7%
Agreeableness 1.258 25.8% 1.215 21.5%
Conscientiousness 0.854 -14.6% 1.067 6.7%
Neuroticism 2.492 149.2% 2.545 154.5%
Openness 2.389 138.9% 0.71 -29.0%
Gender 1.663* 66.3% 1.684* 68.4%
Education 1.037 3.7% 1.05 5.0%
Income 1.073 7.3% 1.072 7.2%
Constant 0.523 0.823
Nagelkerke R2
N 514 514
Notes: *p<.05
Table 6. Logistic Regression Results for Risk Preferences and Receiving 
the Loss Frame First using the BFI Scale
DV: Risky OptionChosen=1
Full Item Scales
Scales Based on Factor 
Loadings
0.036 0.033
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Constant 0.016**   0.005***  
Nagelkerke R
2 0.055 0.054 
N 507 507 
Notes: *p<.10; **p<.05;***p<.01   
  
The logistic equation results demonstrate that none of the personality variables 
explain whether a person will respond as making the risky or sure choice when receiving 
the gain or loss frames first.  However, two control variables are significant.  When 
exposed to the gain frame first (Table 7), those with higher income levels are over thirty 
percent more likely to choose the risky option than lower income levels for both Big Five 
measurements, which goes against what is expected from prospect theory.  However, this 
variable loses significance when the loss frame is given first.  Instead, gender becomes 
the only significant predictor of risky choice.  Table 6 demonstrates that women are about 
66 percent more likely to choose the risky option when the loss frame is presented first in 
both Big Five scale measurements.  This supports what is expected from prospect theory 
– when options are placed in a loss frame, people are more likely to choose the risky 
option.  The final two tables present the same dependent variables with personality 
typologies and demonstrate the same statistical significant variables. 
Discussion 
 Before moving on, two main problems must be actively discussed.  The first is the 
sample.  Because the data comes from a hereditary study, it is composed of only 
monozygotic and same sex dizygotic twins and not a random sample within the 
population as a whole.  Second, the people within the sample only come from Minnesota 
and the frequencies demonstrate that it does not depict the general population.  This is 
especially true for race, where less than 2 percent were not white.  The notion that all 44 
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BFI items do not load onto the traditional 5 factors supports the idea that the sample is 
not representative of more random ones.  These problems must be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results.   
 The second problem is that there is only one prospect theory question used for the 
analysis.  With multiple items dealing with prospect theory, a better understanding of 
how people make choices would be available.  A fuller understanding of whether and 
how preference change occurs may be more accessible with several different problem 
sets offering different preferences for each.  Not only that there is one set of prospect 
theory items and framing theory more generally, but prospect theory is considered 
somewhat different than other types of frames (Levin et al. 1998; 2002).  Equivalency 
framing has examples in the political world, for example the death tax versus the 
inheritance tax.  However, frames often consist of more substantial content differences, 
such as how Iyengar (1991) describes news coverage as being episodic and dealing with 
the context of one event or thematic, emphasizing the underlying concepts of an event.  
Therefore, framing studies using prospect theory may result in different findings when 
other types of frames are used.  Changes in content beyond one or two words (most likely 
used to induce emotion) or manner of information is likely to induce more variance than 
what is seen in prospect theory.  The larger variance and nuances that are found in the 
real political world will allow research to better understand personality‟s role in the 
framing effect.  
 These two problems may have resulted in the inability of the study to replicate 
what Levin et al. (2002) did in terms of personality traits and risky framing effects.  
Where Levin and colleagues found a preference change in magnitude of choice between 
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risky and risk averse options, this study only found significance for agreeableness.  Even 
when the models looked at one sided frame options, initial exposure to the gain or loss 
frame, none of the personality factors were found to be significant in understanding 
variance between those choosing the sure or risky option.  However, Levin‟s (2002)study 
used a prospect theory item that was worded to make the issue close to them personally: 
what medical option would the person choose for their parents when faced with a serious 
cholesterol problem.  In addition, the respondent had a choice on a scale of one to seven.  
Therefore, not only is there information on whether he/she changed preference, the 
researcher also has a change in magnitude even if the actual preference does not change.  
These smaller changes in magnitude may be more important to understand, because the 
research can begin to understand the turning points.  To what degree does the frame have 
to push in order for it to change someone‟s preference?  The study by Levin et al. (2002) 
were able to have a more precise measure of the dependent variable which may also lead 
to more reliable information.  
 Although there are the above problems, this thesis demonstrates that the BFI scale 
can be used to create similar cluster typologies found using other five factor models, such 
as the California Q Sort (York and John, 1992; Asendorpf et al. 2001; Robins et al. 1996) 
and the NEO-PI-R (Pulkkinen 1996; Asendorpf et al. 2001), both of which are much 
longer and more detailed inventories.  Although it may make intuitive sense to look at a 
person‟s personality in its entirety, rather than the different trait scale variables 
individually, this study does not find that there is any value in doing so in the context of 
understanding prospect theory framing effects.  If the above problems were addressed, 
the typological method may prove itself to be important to political scientists.  People are 
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not made of one trait, but many (in similar) combinations.  People are not the same as one 
trait and each trait does not evenly affect a person.  Based on personality typology 
literature, there is promise in understanding a person through sets of traits.  The above 
research shows promise for at least an inquiry into the effects of typologies based on the 
fact that they seem to have the same controlling dynamics as the trait models.  More 
emphasis on typologies may lead to an understanding of what traits win out when it 
comes to the framing effect.  The importance of trait typologies Mondak and colleagues 
as well as Gerber and co-authors have been prevalent in recent studies on personality 
traits and their influence on political variables.  Mondak (2010; Mondak et al. 2010) has 
looked at external influences that influence the connection between politics and such 
things as political participation but none of the work concerning political behavior has 
attempted to look at combinations of traits to determine their influence.  The data here 
suggests that solely looking at traits does not give a full picture of what is going on.  
Agreeableness is found to be significant as a predictor of preference change when looked 
at alone, but when put into a person-centered model, agreeableness falls back and none of 
the models show significant results.  Therefore, the power of agreeableness is contained 
by other trait levels.   
 Part of the problem of working within the typology realm is that it is plagued by 
many of the problems seen with work on the five factor models years ago (Robins et al. 
1998) where researchers are talking past each other rather than working together to create 
a set of consistent typologies and what they consist of in the general population.  This is 
evident from the different labels given to the factors.  In addition, there is clearly less 
research altogether of typologies than there is of the Big Five taxonomy.  As more and 
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more research is done, the theoretical basis and understanding of how traits work together 
to create behavior will be much more influential.  This thesis is only the beginning in 
understanding how personality, not only by using individual trait measures but with 
typologies as well, influences the framing effect.  
 Getting to the main finding of the study, agreeableness is the only personality 
trait, in the two models demonstrating a significant effect on preference change.  Not only 
is it significant and in the proper direction according to the hypothesis, but it has a large 
effect at around 116 percent.  This goes back to the trusting nature of those who score 
high on agreeableness (Costa and McCrae 1995) which may signify that they are not 
reflecting the context of the message beyond what is there – they trust what they are told.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that the level of statistical significance for 
agreeableness in both Table 4 and Table 5 is p<.10, suggesting caution in the 
interpretation of the external validity of these results. 
 The only other significant variable is the dummy variable used to indicate which 
set of problems the participant received first.  When someone received the loss frame 
first, they were over 50 percent less likely to change their preferences.  Once people were 
initially exposed to the negative frame, they continued to either choose the risky option or 
the sure option.  This finding leads back to the research indicating the strength negative 
frames have on people (e.g. Druckman 2004; Erison, Lodge and Tabor 2007).  The power 
of negative frames to influence the consistency of decision choices has important 
implications for those attempting to define an issue.  Based on the current findings, if one 
can formulate a risky choice problem in a negative or loss light first, they may be able 
tomaintain a consistent level of preference for an issue for a certain amount of time. 
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 Last, when attempting to understand whether the loss frame or gain frame induces 
people to make a sure or risky choice is explained by personality factors, none of the 
coefficients for the independent variables are significant.  Control variables turn out to be 
the ones that matter in the initial preference and it is a separate variable different for the 
gain than the loss condition.  The only variable that achieves significance in the gain 
frame is income.  The logistic regression results for Table 7 and Table 9 show that people 
with higher income levels are less likely to make a choice supported by prospect theory 
by being more likely to choose the risky option in a gain framed problem.  This may be 
an artifact of the amount of money in the problems ($3,000 and $4,000) not being as 
valuable to those that make more money.  Second, with only looking at those who 
received the loss frame first, gender is the only significant variable in the equation.  
Women were found to be much more apt to choosing the risky option in the loss frame, 
which corresponds with the literature on choices in prospect theory, in Table 6 and Table 
8.  Therefore, personality cannot explain the willingness to take the risky option in gain or 
loss conditions.   
 With such little significance in explaining preferences and their changes through 
personality, one must ask what does make almost 80 percent of the people change their 
preference for a risky choice versus a sure one?  Although the work of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1989; Kahneman and Tversky 1979) does not explicitly say so, their writing 
suggests that this is a human universal, which other research points to the possibility that 
it has been selected for at some point in our history based on the need to survive 
(McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov 2008).  In addition, research on neuroimaging 
suggests that when people go with the framing effect, only certain parts of the brain - 
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many of which deal with emotions - is aroused (DeMartino et al. 2006).  This notion 
corresponds with the work of Druckman and McDermott (2008) who find that emotional 
variables influence the framing effect using prospect theory.  With these studies in mind, 
and the multitude of other studies which find significance in emotions and attitude 
change (e.g. Mayer and Tormala 2010; Brader 2005; Gross and Brewer 1999).  
Preference change, with prospect theory, appears to not be explained by individual 
variance but as a universal phenomenon with the changing context is what causes the 
effect in its entirety. 
 This brings us to the last point, the lack of context in the study.  Because this is a 
survey, the context of the frame is limited to two options dealing with money.  Druckman 
(2001b; 2004) discusses the potential erroneous results that come out of equivalency 
framing studies, such as those using prospect theory frames.  The problem with it is that 
reality is not reflected in making a choice between prospect theory options.  For instance, 
would people change their preference if it was the government getting/losing money or 
what the government was going to do with the money gained or what they have to cut in 
order to accommodate the money lost?  The answer is probably yes.  The question then 
repeats itself.  Is there a personality difference among those that do make a preference 
change and those that do not when these political factors are put into context? 
 This is the next step.  Explaining framing effect variance cannot be understood 
without adding context.  While the risk of losing/gaining money in a non-realistic option 
set creates somewhat of a universal change in people, personality traits and typologies 
may create significant difference when one must address confounding circumstances.   
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Personality research can extend what has already been looked at with framing 
studies and may help alleviate some of the controversies found in the literature.  For 
instance, high agreeableness may create a large framing effect based on source cues 
because it creates higher levels of trusting in individuals.  How information in frames is 
conveyed to people also might be a factor.  With lengthy frames, those with low levels of 
conscientiousness or higher levels of neuroticism may not be able to weed out what is 
important and succumb to the framing effect based on the work of Heinström (2003) but 
may not when the frame is presented in a short and direct manner.  These are only partial 
hypotheses that may come out of looking at frames with more political context.  In 
developing full hypotheses on how personality traits may affect preferences tied to 
framing effects, it is important to look at how these personality traits interact with each 
other too.  Source clues are likely to play a role in resisting framing effects for 
overcontrollers who tend to be distrustful (Block 1971).  Using frames that depict the 
political world and previous framing literature opens the door for how personality may 
affect preference change. 
Conclusion 
The ease of preference change induced by frames can be traced back to 
Converse‟s (1964) conclusion that people do not have coherent beliefs that allow for 
coherent opinions.  Although Converse‟s main argument deals with the ability to align 
one‟s beliefs on a political continuum identifiable by being conservative or liberal, it 
highlights the point of how frames are able to easily adjust a preference.  People were 
found to be unable to place themselves on the same side of an issue on repeated 
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occasions.  If there is no coherent opinion on political topics and arguments, it is quite 
easy for people to change preferences based on a frame.   
 Newer research also demonstrates how frames may potentially affect preference 
change.   Mutz (2006) argues people are no longer having discussion with people of 
opposing viewpoints and the findings suggest that news sources use a partisan filter in the 
news (Baum and Groeling 2008), that people are aware of potential slants in the news and 
use them to make opinions (Turner 2007) and people‟s television habits are largely based 
on their previous political preferences (Prior 2007; Iyengar and Hahn 2009).  These 
findings pooled together indicate that people are only being exposed to one set of frames 
which is dangerous according to Druckman‟s (2004) “double-edged sword” where 
confidence in a frame-based preference is heightened and group think becomes 
prominent.   
 The contemporary argument that people are able to expose themselves to one side 
and, limit exposure to opposing frames, and the more historical argument that people can 
change their stance on the issue because there is no coherent opinion poses strong 
evidence that frames potentially have a large effect on people‟s preferences.  Frames can 
create opinion with either argument, one never interrupts a continuous set of way of 
thinking and the other creates preference changes relatively easily and quickly.  
 How people perceive the world is dependent on their personality – it causes 
someone to be trusting of information or critical of it; and it induces people to seek 
challenges to what they know or confirm their knowledge; it changes preferences and it 
maintains preferences in light of new information.  Understanding how perceptions of the 
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political world are altered through frames will only help researchers to understand 
whether a “good” frame exists or it is contingent on an individual. 
 The thesis presented here attempts to understand how people react differently 
under prospect theory choices to which they were exposed in order to uncover whether 
preference change is mediated by personality or if it is common across all types of 
people.  Findings presented here indicate agreeableness as the only personality variable 
causing variance in preference change.  However, moving away from prospect theory and 
into the world of political rhetoric may change the results here. 
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Appendix A Big Five Inventory 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do 
you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
that statement. 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree a 
Little 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree a Little Agree Strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
I see Myself as Someone Who... 
___1. Is talkative  
___2. Tends to find fault with others  
___3. Does a thorough job  
___4. Is depressed, blue  
___5. Is original, comes up with new  
ideas  
___6. Is reserved  
___7. Is helpful and unselfish with  
others  
___8. Can be somewhat careless  
___9. Is relaxed, handles stress well  
___10. Is curious about many different  
things  
___11. Is full of energy  
___12. Starts quarrels with others  
___13. Is a reliable worker  
___14. Can be tense  
___15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker  
___16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm  
___17. Has a forgiving nature  
___18. Tends to be disorganized 
___19. Worries a lot  
___20. Has an active imagination 
___21. Tends to be quiet  
___22. Is generally trusting  
___23. Tends to be lazy 
___24. Is emotionally stable, not easily  
upset 
___25. Is inventive 
___26. Has an assertive personality 
___27. Can be cold and aloof 
___28. Perseveres until the task is  
finished 
___29. Can be moody 
___30. Values artistic, aesthetic  
experiences 
___31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
___32. Is considerate and kind to almost  
everyone 
___33. Does things efficiently 
___34. Remains calm in tense situations 
___35. Prefers work that is routine 
___36. Is outgoing, sociable 
___37. Is sometimes rude to others 
___38. Makes plans and follows through  
with them 
___39. Gets nervous easily 
___40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
___41. Has few artistic interests 
___42. Likes to cooperate with others 
___43. Is easily distracted 
___44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or  
literature 
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Appendix B Control Variables 
Income 
 
Respondents were asked the following question and given the stated choices to 
determine his/her level of income.  The coding used in the models of the thesis is 
identical to the number associated with the response.  Higher data points indicate higher 
income levels.  The response, “Don‟t wish to say,” was coded as missing in the models. 
 
What was your annual family income for 2007? 
1 – Under $20,000 
2 - $20,000 to under $40,000 
3 - $40,000 to under $60,000 
4 - $60,000 to under $80,000 
5 - $80,000 to under $100,000 
6 - $100,000 or more 
7 – Don‟t wish to say 
 
Education 
 
Participants were asked the following question and given the stated choices to 
determine his/her education level.  The coding used in the models of the thesis is identical 
to the number associated with the response.  Higher data points indicate higher education 
levels. “Other” responses were coded as missing in the models. 
1 – Grades 1-12, did not graduate from High School 
2 – High School Graduate 
3 – Some trade or technical training after High School 
4 – Some college or A.A. degree 
5 – College degree 
6 – Professional or graduate training or degree after college 
7 – Other  
 
Gender 
 
Respondents were asked, “What is your gender?”  This was a required question in 
the survey.  The data was originally coded as 1 = male and 2 = woman.  However, the 
models use a recoded version so that females = 1 and male = 0. 
58 
Frame Order Dummy Variable 
This variable codes whether the participant received the gain or the loss framed 
first.  The original data set supplied by Kevin Smith and John Hibbing held four sets of 
prospect theory problems, two being gain framed problems and two being loss framed 
problems.  The data was organized in this way because it was randomized on whether the 
participant received the gain or loss frame first.  
 Therefore, one set of participants received the first two of the four prospect theory 
problems, where the gain frame was first, followed by the loss frame.  The other 
participants received the second set of problems, where the loss frame was first, followed 
by the gain frame.  Those that answered the problems for the first set of problems (gain 
first) are coded as 0 and those respondents receiving the second set of problems (loss 
frame first) are coded as 1. 
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Appendix D Factor Analysis of Personality Trait Scales 
Table C.1 Factor Analysis for Logged BFI Items 
 Factors 
BFI Scale 
Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Item 1 0.761        
Item 2    0.535     
Item 3       0.604  
Item 4   0.558      
Item 5  0.717       
Item 6 0.743        
Item 7    0.547     
Item 8     0.608    
Item 9   0.740      
Item 10  0.584       
Item 11 0.368        
Item 12    0.487     
Item 13       0.714  
Item 14   0.649      
Item 15  0.706       
Item 16 0.542        
Item 17    0.636     
Item 18     0.760    
Item 19   0.741      
Item 20  0.693       
Item 21 0.836        
Item 22    0.559     
Item 23     0.555    
Item 24   0.639      
Item 25  0.777       
Item 26 0.603        
Item 27    0.532     
Item 28     0.506    
Item 29   0.526      
Item 30      0.710   
Item 31 0.748        
Item 32    0.697     
Item 33     0.585    
Item 34   0.621      
Item 35        0.595 
Item 36 0.755        
Item 37    0.608     
60 
Item 38     0.609    
Item 39   0.724      
Item 40  0.714       
Item 41      0.743   
Item 42    0.585     
Item 43     0.626    
Item 44      0.724   
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Appendix E Descriptive Statistics 
Variable
N Min Max Mean (s.d.)
Preference Change 1316 0 1 .72 (.448)
Sex 1349 0 1 .63 (.484)
Income 1025 1 6 4.03 (1.549)
Education 1312 1 6 3.99 (1.367)
Extroversion 1333 1 5 3.29 (.851)
Agreeableness 1333 2 5 4.18 (.545)
Conscientiousness 1333 1 5 4.19 (.569)
Neuroticism 1333 1 5 2.58 (.801)
Openness 1333 1 5 3.44 (.683)
Extroversion 1333 0.00 1.00 .459 (.227)
Agreeableness 1333 0.00 1.00 .665 (.204)
Conscientiousness 1333 0.00 1.00 .683 (.204)
Neuroticism 1333 0.00 1.00 .290 (.177)
Openness 1333 0.00 1.00 .471 (.194)
Cluster 1 1333 0.00 1.00 .058 (.233)
Cluster 2 1333 0.00 1.00 .742 (.438)
Gain 654 0 1 .06 (.243)
Loss 670 0 1 .70 (.457)
First Condition (1=risky choice)
Table E. Descriptive Statistics
Dependent
Controls
Raw Score BFI Scales
Logged Score BFI Scales
Typologies
 
